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Introduction
California’s coast is one of the state’s and the nation’s premier locations.
Home to millions of people, as well as a great diversity of natural features and
habitats, it is also a place that is disappearing from beneath our feet. The dynamic
interactions of water and land have eroded much of the historic California coast, and
sea level rise threatens a dramatic acceleration of this trend. 1 Fighting erosion has
led to more than ten percent of California’s shoreline (and over thirty percent in
southern California) being transformed from natural to man-made structures that
resist, at least for a time, the forces of wind and wave. 2
But the fortress undermines itself. Sea walls and armoring protect
properties for a time, but result in accelerated erosion nearby, and eventually
disrupt the dynamics of the entire coastal system. The regulatory system governing
shoreline management under the California Coastal Act (“Coastal Act”) is complex
and is generally designed to discourage armoring. In choosing armoring, shorefront
property owners not only commit to an enormous expenditure of money to
construct and maintain the structure, but also engage in a time-consuming,
contentious and expensive process to get approval for their actions. The costs to the
owners are matched, or exceeded, by the administrative burden borne by public
agencies – in this case local governments and the California Coastal Commission –
charged with granting approval.
Alternatives to coastal armoring in the form of natural infrastructure 3 are
now viable alternatives to engineered structures in many situations. Wetlands,
dunes, oyster beds, and kelp forests are natural features that enhance the ability of
both human and natural systems to respond to sea level rise. Such “natural
infrastructure” can be cost effective, or at least cost competitive, with hard armoring
responses, particularly over the extended periods required in the face of rising seas.
Despite the advantages of these approaches, the regulatory regime does little to
encourage their use, and they have been rarely deployed.
1 Heberger M, Cooley H, Herrera P, Gleick PH and Moore E, “The Impacts of Sea Level Rise on the
California Coast” (Sacramento CA, 2009), http://mail.wecalc.org/reports/sea_level_rise/report.pdf.
2 Melius et al. 2015
3 “Natural infrastructure is the preservation and/or restoration of ecological systems, or utilization
of engineered systems that use ecological processes, to increase resiliency to climate change and/or
manage other environmental problems. This may include, but is not limited to, floodplain and
wetland restoration or preservation, combining levees with restored ecological systems to reduce
flood risk, and urban trees to mitigate high heat days.” State of California. Legislature. Assembly. An
act to amend Section 75125 of, and to add Part 3.7 (commencing with Section 71150) to Division 34 of,
the Public Resources Code, relating to climate change. Assembly Bill No. 1482 (Gordon), 2015-2016
Regular Session.
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To achieve the Coastal Act’s purposes in an era of steadily increasing threats
to shoreline properties from rising sea levels, California will have to find ways to
provide incentives for property owners to deviate from business-as-usual practice
of shoreline armoring. The current approach certainly permits natural
infrastructure to be used, and can be seen as generally supportive of the idea, but
the current process does not send strong enough signals to property owners and
can take inordinate time to arrive at decisions. The time spent reviewing every
single property owner’s actions will become a major burden on regulators and the
regulated community as flooding events become both more common and more
damaging.
We believe it is possible to do better. Similar inefficiencies in other
environmental regulatory processes have led to the development of markets for
tradable permits that can achieve better environmental results at lower costs. Such
systems as “cap and trade” air quality regulation and transferable development
rights in land use have been widely and successfully deployed in the U.S. and other
countries.

In this paper we draw on this experience to propose a tradable permits
system that can make shoreline protection both more available when needed and
less environmentally damaging when used. We define objectives for such a system
based on the principles espoused by the Coastal Act and on experience with other
tradable permits. We evaluate the prototype against the known characteristics of
successful permit market systems. We conclude that a market-based tradable
permit system for shoreline protection for California is feasible and identify a
number of legal and policy issues to be investigated further.

Options for Shoreline Protection: Coastal Armoring and Natural
Infrastructure

Hard armoring can be effective in its principal goal of protecting property, at
least over some period of time, and can also be put into place relatively quickly. 4
The technical principles behind hard coastal armoring are relatively well
understood, with clear design specifications and performance standards. However,
hard armoring can limit sand supply and reduce the width of beaches in a number of
ways, increasing erosion rates in neighboring properties (and further increasing the
demand for armoring) as well as reducing recreational opportunities. These effects
intensify as beaches narrows due to erosion and the impoundment of sand behind
the armoring structure. Shoreline armoring associated beach loss will also reduce
intertidal and sandy beach habitat, impacting shorebirds and coastal flora and
fauna. According to a 2008 study of coastal armoring, armored beaches had
significantly fewer and smaller intertidal macro-invertebrates, three times fewer
4

Hanak E and Moreno G, “California Coastal Management with a Changing Climate” (2012) 111 Clim.
Chang. 45.
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shorebirds, and four to seven times fewer gulls and other birds than unarmored
beaches. 5

The concept of natural infrastructure, on the other hand, means using open
space between the ocean and developed land to absorb floodwaters and reduce
wave energy. Wetlands, dunes, oyster beds, and kelp forests are natural features
that can help land – submerged or terrestrial – function as natural infrastructure,
protecting parts of the California coast from sea level rise and storm impacts.
Natural infrastructure improves the ability of natural systems to respond to sea
level rise and migrate landward, ensuring their survival. In turn, these systems
provide benefits for coastal communities as protective buffers against sea level riseenhanced -storm events while continuing to provide access, recreation
opportunities, and other social benefits. These benefits have been well
documented. 6
In two recent studies, The Nature Conservancy (TNC) and partners have
evaluated the costs and benefits of both natural infrastructure and traditional
armoring. In Ventura County, two hypothetical responses to sea level rise were
evaluated, one an engineered management scenario and the other a natural
infrastructure scenario. Results showed that both approaches reduce damages
significantly; however, the natural infrastructure approach provides additional
ecosystem service benefits in terms of preserving or restoring the natural functions
of the ecosystem. 7 A similar study in southern Monterey Bay compared the
economic performance of a suite of stakeholder-selected climate adaptation
strategies. The results again demonstrated that hard armoring the shoreline has the
lowest net present value of any of the options, whereas managed retreat or beach
nourishment were most economically sound in different segments of the coastline
within the study area. 8

5

Dugan, Jennifer, “Ecological Effects of Armoring California Beaches” (2008) Marine Ecology 160,
160-170
6 Arkema KK, Guannel G, Verutes G, Wood S a., Guerry A, Ruckelshaus M, Kareiva P, Lacayo M and
Silver JM, “Coastal Habitats Shield People and Property from Sea-Level Rise and Storms” (2013) 3
Nat. Clim. Chang. 913, http://www.nature.com/doifinder/10.1038/nclimate1944.
7 ENVIRON International Corporation, “Economic Analysis of Nature-Based Adaptation to Climate
Change-Ventura County California” (2015) The Nature Conservancy-California
8 Newkirk S, Leo K, Heady W, Cohen B, Calli J, King P, McGregor A, DePaolis F, Vaughn RK, Giliam J,
Environmental Science Associates and Revell DL, “Economic Impacts of Climate Adaptation Strategies
for Southern Monterey Bay” (Oakland, CA, 2016).
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Despite the advantages of natural infrastructure, hard armoring remains the
default choice for shoreline protection in California and most other parts of the
country for several reasons. Stanford’s Environmental Law Clinic identified several
obstacles to the use of natural infrastructure. One of the Clinic’s most important
findings was that there is a tendency for people to “do what they know” when
confronted with the significant risks of flood damages. Combined with a lack of datasupported, scientific standards for how to deploy natural infrastructure in many
areas, the result is that risk averse decision makers are biased against the “new”
ideas of natural infrastructure and in favor of the “proven” armoring approaches. 9
The California Coastal Act is a comprehensive framework for planning and
regulating land and water uses, including shoreline protection, along the coast. The
goals of the Coastal Act are to protect and enhance coastal resources, ensure
balanced resource use, ensure access and recreational use, prioritize coastaldependent uses (which excludes residential uses), and encourage coordinated state
and local planning. 10 The Coastal Act created the California Coastal Commission,
charged with exercising a combination of planning, oversight, and regulatory
authorities.

Within this framework, local governments are encouraged to use their
authority to regulate coastal land use to guide development, consistent with the
goals and policies established by the Act. Local Coastal Programs (LCPs) are the
principal means by which they do this. An LCP is a combination of land use plans,
maps, and zoning ordinances that determine how the Coastal Act will be
implemented in a specific city or county. 11 Each local government is charged with
developing one or more LCPs for areas of the coastal zone within its jurisdiction,
and amending or updating those LCPs as circumstances change. 12 The Coastal
Commission reviews each proposed LCP and, as appropriate, certifies it once the
LCP is found to be consistent with the Coastal Act. 13 Upon certification, authority to
regulate coastal development through issuance of coastal development permits
(CDPs) is transferred to the local government. 14 In areas without an approved LCP,
the Coastal Commission retains this authority.

This transfer of permitting authority gives local governments authority to
regulate many coastal armoring projects. However, the Coastal Commission
exercises either original (where no LCP applies) or appellate jurisdiction over
applications for permits to develop armoring structures. 15 The Coastal Commission
also retains original regulatory jurisdiction over proposed development on

Stanford Law School Coastal Policy Lab, Local Barriers to Nature Based Strategies for Coastal Hazard
Mitigation in California (2015).
10 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30001.5.
11 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30108.6
12 Id. at §§ 30500–30525.
13 Id. at § 50512.
14 Id. at § 30600.
15 Id. at §§ 30519, 30601.
9
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tidelands, submerged lands, public trust lands, and certain other areas within a
specific distance from the shore, as well as over most major public works projects. 16
Finally, the Coastal Commission has appellate jurisdiction over approvals of
development between the sea and the first public road paralleling the sea. 17
Two main provisions in the Coastal Act govern shoreline armoring
permitting. Section 30235 states that armoring shall be allowed to protect existing
structures under certain conditions. Specifically:

Revetments, breakwaters, groins, harbor channels, seawalls, cliffs, retaining
walls, and other such construction that alters natural shoreline processes
shall be permitted when required to serve coastal-dependent uses or to
protect existing structures or public beaches in danger from erosion and
when designed to eliminate or mitigate adverse impacts on local shoreline
sand supply. 18

In contrast, Section 30253 prohibits new development if it would require a coastal
armoring structure. According to this section, new development shall do all of the
following:
(a) Minimize risks to life and property in areas of high geologic, flood, and
fire hazard.

(b) Assure stability and structural integrity, and neither create nor contribute
significantly to erosion, geologic instability, or destruction of the site or
surrounding area or in any way require the construction of protective
devices that would substantially alter natural land-forms along bluffs and
cliffs. 19

Read together, the most reasonable interpretation of Coastal Act Sections
30235 and 30253 is that they express a broad legislative intent to allow shoreline
protection for development that was in existence when the Coastal Act was passed
in 1976, but that armoring to protect development built after the Coastal Act should
be avoided. In this way, the Coastal Act’s broad purpose to protect natural shoreline
resources, public access and recreation is achieved to the maximum extent when
new development is being considered. But shoreline development already in
existence in 1976 is “grandfathered” and allowed to be protected from shoreline
hazards if doing so otherwise met Coastal Act objectives, even if this resulted in
adverse resource impacts. Such grandfathering of existing conditions is common
when new land use and resource protection policies are put in place.
Id. at §§ 30519, 30600–01.
Id. at § 30603(a)
18 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30235
19 Cal. Pub. Res. Code § 30253.
16

17
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Nonetheless, the Coastal Commission has, at various times, interpreted these
sections differently. 20 In some cases, the shoreline protection being proposed to
protect a post-Coastal Act structure has been justified as being necessary to protect
adjacent pre-Coastal Act structures. 21 The Commission has occasionally treated
structures built after 1976 as existing structures entitled to shoreline protection
even if no adjacent pre-Coastal Act structure also requires protection. 22 Still other
interpretations have been adopted by local governments. For example, Marin
County interprets “existing structure” as one built prior to the adoption of its
original LCP (May 13, 1982). 23

In 2015, the Coastal Commission issued its final Sea Level Rise Policy
Guidance California Coastal Commission., providing state agencies and local
governments with best practices for incorporating projected sea level rise into their
practices. Although the Guidance specifically recognizes the conflicting
interpretations of sections 30235 and 30253, and states that – in some
circumstances – the regulator will be without authority to deny a shoreline armoring
permit to an existing structure, it nonetheless states: “this Guidance recommends
the avoidance of hard shoreline armoring whenever possible.” 24
The pairing of extensive existing development and the diversity of possible
interpretations of the Coastal Act’s armoring provisions has led to an ongoing
proliferation of shoreline armoring in California. As of 2005, at least 10.2 percent of
the California outer coast is armored and a third of the Southern California coast
was protected by armoring 25. It is admittedly difficult to discern the exact increase
in armoring after 2005, since the most recent comprehensive dataset is over ten
years out of date. 26 Nonetheless, a cursory review of Commission decisions reveals
an ongoing trend of permitting armoring under both emergency and non-emergency
conditions.

Theory and Practice of Market Approaches

The merger of pro-environment incentives with market forces began more or
less contemporaneously with current environmental law. 27 Two important
innovations in regulation have emerged from efforts to apply the ideas of economics
to environmental policy. One is tradable emissions permits (TEP’s), which have
been implemented primarily in the regulation of air emissions. The other

Todd Cardiff, Conflict in the California Coastal Act: Sand and Seawalls, 38 Cal. W. L. Rev. 255 (2001).
California Coastal Commission, “Sea Level Rise Policy Guidance” (Sacramento CA, 2015).
22 Id.
23 Marin County LCP, Policy C-EH-13
24 California Coastal Commission, “Sea Level Rise Policy Guidance” (Sacramento CA, 2015).
25 Gary B. Griggs. The impacts of coastal armoring. Shore and beach 73 (1), 13-22 (2005).
26 California Department of Natural Resources, Coastal Erosion Armoring 2005 (2005)
27 Kneese A and Schulze C, Pollution, Prices, and Public Policy (Resources for the Future, Washington,
D.C., 1975).
20
21
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application is in land use management, where transferable development rights are a
market approach to allocating the density of development across a defined
landscape.

Tradable Emission Permits, or TEP’s, are most widely used in air quality
regulatory programs. 28 Rather than a permit that specifies a technology, a resource
user is given an allocation of emissions which, totaled across all emitters and capped
at target levels, reduces emissions by allowing individual emitters to choose how to
meet their goals by either direct reductions or indirect reductions (buying other
emitters’ rights). If the user is successful in reducing emissions below their target
they may sell the unused allocation to another user seeking to meet their target.
Tradable permits have been proposed or applied in a number of other
environmental management situations including water quality 29, biodiversity 30, and
land use. 31

Market approaches combined with environmental incentives have also been
applied in the land use context in the form of transferable development rights or
TDR’s. TDR’s are a market based approach to allocating land uses in order to
achieve a balance between development and conservation within a defined region.
Those seeking to develop land in designated zones, or to develop in certain ways
such as at a higher density, may do so only by purchasing the development rights to
land from owners of rights in another part of the region. Purchased rights can then
be effectively “retired,” creating conservation areas where development will not
take place or is severely limited. This approach provides incentives for landowners
to conserve their land, since they can effectively be paid what they would have
earned if the land had been developed. “Conservation” in TDR systems has been
defined in various ways, including conserving open space, wildlife habitat, or
historic properties. 32
28

Tietenberg T, Emissions Trading Principles and Practice (2nd ed, Resources or the Future,
Waashington, DC, 2006); Kennedy P, “Environmental Damage and Emissions Trading.pdf” (1999) 32
Can. J. Econ. 1313; Ellerman a. D, “A Note on Tradeable Permits” (2005) 31 Environ. Resour. Econ.
123.
29 Hung MF and Shaw D, “A Trading-Ratio System for Trading Water Pollution Discharge Permits”
(2005) 49 J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 83.
30 Drechsler M and Wätzold F, “Applying Tradable Permits to Biodiversity Conservation: Effects of
Space-Dependent Conservation Benefits and Cost Heterogeneity on Habitat Allocation” (2009) 68
Ecol. Econ. 1083, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecolecon.2008.07.019.
31 Henger R and Bizer K, “Tradable Planning Permits for Land-Use Control in Germany” (2010) 27
Land use policy 843, http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landusepol.2009.11.003.
32 Fulton W, Mazurek J, Williamson C and Pruetz R, “TDRs and Other Market-Based Land
Mechanisms: How They Work and Their Role in Shaping Metropolitan Growth” (Washington DC,
2004); Kaplowitz MD, Machemer P and Pruetz R, “Planners’ Experiences in Managing Growth Using
Transferable Development Rights (TDR) in the United States” (2008) 25 Land use policy 378.
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TEPs and TDRs share the basic principle of providing options for meeting
environmental outcomes and encouraging individuals to choose the lowest cost
options, where “costs” include both the cost to the individual and to the
environment. Market-based approaches should achieve overall environmental
outcomes that are equal to or superior to what regulation could achieve and to do so
at lower administrative/transaction costs to both the private individuals and the
public. The key to making a market based approach to permitting in shoreline
protection possible is the increasingly widespread recognition that there is a costcompetitive, environmentally preferable alternative to hard armoring, which is at
least as effective over the long term. Natural infrastructure provides this alternative.

A Prototype Tradable Permits System

Markets are institutions with rules and procedures, and it is these features of
markets that determine their ability to meet the policy objectives for which they are
established. 33 Rules need to cover the spatial extent of the regulatory coverage; the
denominations of tradable permits must be defined. It is also necessary to define
the relationship between the market and the environment by relating the number of
permits available for trade to the environmental goals chosen.

This paper posits that a tradable permit system, created under the auspices
of the Coastal Act, would lead to a rationalized permitting system that produces
environmentally preferable outcomes. The tradable permit system we propose rests
on several elements:
•

•

•

Permit Units. A permit to undertake action to protect shoreline property will
be comprised of permit units, which are units of exchange in the system.

Permission to Act is a Function of the Proposed Action and the Number of
Permit Units Required for that Action. Actual permission to undertake
alterations of the shoreline will only be granted when permit units equal to
the number required for the proposed action are in possession of the
property owner 34 proposing shoreline alteration for protection purposes.

Initial Allocation. Property owners at risk from coastal flooding now or in the
future would be granted an initial allocation of permit units that represents a
partial right to take action to protect their property. The initial allocation
would be proportional to the size of the property, as measured (for example)

33

Field BC and Conrad JM, “Economic Issues in Programs of Transferable Development Righes”
(1975) 51 Land Econ. 331.
34 Collective property ownership forms such as condominiums would be treated as a single entity for
purposes of the permits.
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•

•

•
•

•

•

in feet fronting the shoreline. The initial allocation would in no case be
sufficient to undertake protective shoreline alterations. 35

The price (in permit units) for permission to act will be proportional to the
adverse environmental effects of the action taken. Low impact actions such as
sand dune restoration will require the fewest permit units, while hard
armoring with seawalls will require the most.
The price in permit units shall be expressed as a multiple of the initial
allocation. The cost of taking action to protect property would be expressed
by a multiple over the initial allocation. Thus a low impact action might have
a price of 10% more than the initial allocation while a high impact allocation
might have a price of 100% more than the initial allocations (the multiples
may be adjusted for different regions depending on environmental resources
at issue in specific areas.) The use of multiples relative to initial allocations
also automatically adjusts for property size.

Permit Unit Sales. Holders of permit units are free to buy or sell them at
whatever price is mutually agreeable.

Permit Units are nontaxable assets of the property. Upon sale of a property,
whatever permit units are associated with the property are transferred with
the sale. The price of the units shall be included in the price of the property
at mutually agreeable terms. However, the value of the permit units would
be exempt from ad valorem real or personal property taxes and sales taxes,
and income from the sales of permit units shall not be taxable under the
California income tax in order to prevent tax policy from distorting the
functioning of the shoreline protection permit markets.

Property owners may sell all their permit units. Property owners may sell any
or all of their initial allocation. Property owners who own no permits units
will still be required to obtain the requisite number of permit units should
they choose to take shoreline alterations to protect their property.

Emergency Responses. Current law allows property owners faced with
imminent threats of flooding to implement protection measures without
extensive permitting. These provisions would be retained with the permit
unit trading system. In emergency conditions, permission would be
automatically available for taking temporary measures to protect property
and lives, but all of the property owner’s permit units would be held in
escrow until the temporary measures are removed. Such measures could not
include permanent hard armoring and any steps taken to convert a

35

See the discussion below re the application of the “existing”/”new” property criterion under
section 30235 of the Coastal Act.
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•

•

temporary solution to a permanent one would require the appropriate
number of permit units.

A Permit Bank will be established to be the keeper of records, to be a market
maker, and may trade permit units on its own account to provide funding for
shoreline management or restoration actions of regional significance. The
Bank would be an entity established in legislation, which serves as both the
administrator of the system and as an important part of the market itself.
The Bank serves as a central recorder of all transactions (including providing
information to County records).

An Environmental Agency will be designated with responsibility for
establishing environmental protection and restoration goals in each region, for
monitoring the attainment of these goals, and to make (or recommend)
changes in the program if needed. The Environmental Agency is separate
from the Bank. It will be responsible, together with the Bank, for designating
the trading regions. 36 The Environmental Agency will conduct programmatic
environmental impact reviews under the California Environmental Quality
Act when the trading regions are designated. We do not propose a specific
agency to serve this role.

To illustrate the operations of the permit unit system, consider a simple
description of environmental effects of shoreline protection based on three classes
of action. Class 1 has the least impact (for example, dune restoration). Class 2 is a
hybrid approach that is nature based, but also contains elements of armoring, for
example beach nourishment with a groin to retain sand. Class 3 is a steel wall
armored shore. In this example, the required numbers of permit units relative to
the base allocation are set at:
Class 1: 1.2 (20% higher than initial allocation)
Class 2: 1.4 (40% higher than initial allocation)
Class 3: 2.0 (100% higher than initial allocation)

For administrative simplicity, assume that the allocation of permit units
corresponds to a “shore front unit”, which is calculated, for example, as property
front feet/n (where n=10 for illustrative purposes). In this example, the allocation
is set to 1 permit unit per shore front unit. To illustrate the trading process,
consider a hypothetical beach where there are four small beach houses, each with
50 front feet on the beach; one large beach house with 100 front feet, and a
36

As noted above, the geographies associated with LCPs are rarely – if ever – related to
environmental context, nor are they generally large enough to support the landscape diversity
needed to support this system. Accordingly, our proposal envisions trading regions that are not
confined to LCP regions, but the policies established by LCPs falling within the trading region may
inform the marketplace parameters within a given regional marketplace. This will be explored in
greater detail in the next phase of this project.
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condominium or hotel with 250 front feet. Based on the assumption of 1 permit unit
per 10 front feet, the small houses have 5 permit units each, the large house has 10
permit units, and the condo/hotel has 25 permit units.
Using the “permit costs” identified above, assume that the three small houses
decide to restore some dunes on their stretch of the beach, which would protect all
three properties. The permit requirement for this project would be for 20% above
initial allocation, which would be 18 permit units, or a needed increment to be
purchased by the homeowners of 3 units. There is a supply of permit units from
other properties on the beach to provide multiple opportunities for trades.

At the opposite end, the condo/motel chooses to build a seawall. This will
require twice the initial allocation of permit units, or 25 additional units. For the
owners of the condo/motel, they could buy the permit units from the other property
owners on the beach, from other properties in the trading region, or from the Bank.

If the neighbors sold their permit units to the condo/motel, they would then
have the option of using the funds from the sale to purchase the permits to construct
dunes, which would require 30 permit units, or they might decide to nourish the
beach (which would require 35 permits in this example). By negotiating an
appropriate price with the condo/hotel owners, the house owners could acquire all
or a substantial portion of the costs of implementing a less environmentally
damaging solution. The result is a beach that does have a sea wall on it, but it is also
primarily protected with less damaging approaches.
Table A summarizes the relationship between the proposed prototype
permit system and the objectives of regulating shoreline armoring, based on the
Coastal Act and experience with tradable permits:
Objective

Prototype Feature

Owners can purchase permit units to secure
protection, and can select the protection
strategy they feel is most appropriate.
Protection strategies must be paid for in
relationship to environmental damages.

Allow coastal property owners to protect their
property from flooding.

Minimize damage to natural shoreline features
and processes from protection choices.
Maximize the protection and restoration of
environmental resources and processes.

Property owners must remain the key decision
makers, but the permitting system should
encourage them to consider the full range of
protection choices before deciding which to
implement.

12

The system creates incentives for lower damage
choices, better planning for nature based
alternatives, and resources from Bank sales of
permit units for financing restoration projects.

Hard armoring will cease being the "default"
choice when owners have transparent
information on the comparative costs of
protection options.

Objective

Prototype Feature

The permitting system should present the
property owner with costs for the acquisition of
permits that are related to the environmental
effects of the protection strategy.

The number of permit units required to receive
a permit increases as the environmental
damage of the chosen alternative increases.

The initial allocation of permit rights should be
perceived as fair in order to increase
acceptance and confidence.

Initial allocation of permit units will be
proportional to property size but will not be
enough to take any shoreline altering action.

The permitting system should encourage
individual property owners to work together to
use protection choices that provide benefits to
the shoreline and environment beyond the
boundaries of the properties involved.

Property owners can share the costs of
acquiring needed permits leading to
cooperative strategies affecting larger areas.

Markets should be competitive, and transaction
costs, including search costs, should not be so
high as to distort prices.

The Bank will have responsibility for
administering sales transactions and may set up
exchange programs (for example online
auctions) for permit units.

The permitting system should be based on
principles of fair exchange, including the
exchange between willing buyers and willing
sellers, each having access to relevant
information and able to agree on a price
reflecting each participants’ valuation of the
transaction.

Permit units are traded between willing sellers
and willing buyers in a competitive market.
One of the Bank's functions is to assure
competitive and liquid markets. Permit units
and unit sales will be exempt from California
taxation.

The market should not be subject to distortion
through the acquisition of market power which
restricts supply and drives permit prices up.

The size of trading regions and the
responsibility of the Bank to hold a reserve
supply of permit units limits market power.

Regions within which permits are traded will be
defined so as to reflect environmental
conditions and shall be of sufficient size to
assure a functioning market for trading. The
definitions of regions should be adjustable as
sea level rise alters environmental conditions.

Trading regions will be selected based on
balancing ecological characteristics and
sufficient market size. The designation of
trading regions will be subject to environmental
review.

Table A Comparison of Prototype Features with Policy Objectives

The economic dimensions of shoreline armoring have been recognized in
recent actions by the Coastal Commission to charge impact fees to those choosing
sea walls. Impact fees are designed to recover some of the known external costs of
armoring and serve some of the same incentive purposes as the pricing in the
tradable permits approach. But impact fees are administratively determined and
will reflect only the environmental factors. Determining the prices for permit units
in market transactions incorporates not only the environmental damage, but also
13

the relative costs of different protection options as well as the values of the
properties and economic circumstances of the property owners. Determining
impact fees would also be part of the same costly regulatory process as present and
so property owners would pay the permit process costs, impact fees, plus the costs
of implementation. This is an approach that will come under considerable stress
with sea level rise. With the tradable permits approach the property owner faces
only the cost of the permit units and construction costs.

Moving forward

The foregoing analysis shows that a proposed approach to meeting the
Coastal Act’s goals through a tradable permit system for shoreline protection is
feasible, but it still requires substantial additional development to address a number
of legal, technical and institutional issues.
Legal Issues

A steady theme with tradable permit systems has been whether changing
existing expectations with respect to a property through a regulatory process may
constitute a taking under the Constitution. 37 Under the Supreme Court’s decision in
Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, a taking will occur if a regulation “denies all
economically beneficial or productive use of land.” 38 This system would clearly not
eliminate all beneficial use of any parcel, although it could change – either increase
or decrease – the value of the parcel. For some parcels the proposed system would
convert what could be interpreted as a complete right to armor into a fractional
permit, thus – arguably – reducing the value of the parcel associated with the
original right. In other cases, the proposed system may allocate a fractional permit
where no right previously existed, thus increasing the value of the parcel overall.
Over time, depending on the property owners’ use of the fractional permits, any
given parcel could flood or erode to such an extent that the economically beneficial
use of the land was eliminated. However, the occurrence creating this condition
would not be a regulation, but instead a force of nature and the combined with the
property owner’s choices about how to respond to this force.
The present proposal does not distinguish between pre-Coastal Act
development and more recent development for the purposes of assigning initial
permit unit allocations. Although this system would seem to create a fractional
entitlement to armor on the part of many property owners that previously did not
have such an interest, the legal and practical implications of this are unclear. As
discussed above, the Coastal Act policy on seawall permit eligibility has been
37
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variably interpreted, and the availability of emergency exemptions for predictable
conditions has added complexity to the existing legal foundations.

It may be that efficient and effective functioning of a tradable permit system
may require extending partial rights to armor to properties not currently eligible
under this section of the Act, but this is an issue that requires detailed propertylevel analysis to determine the extent of need for such rights. Moreover, as the
differential treatment of “existing” and “new” properties for purposes of armoring is
a function of language in the Coastal Act, it may be necessary to clarify this
distinction, especially since the concepts of “existing” and “new” will themselves
change as shoreline is altered by sea level rise.
Geographic and Operational Details

There is significant diversity in shoreline types and development patterns
along the California coast, from the highly urbanized areas south of Santa Barbara to
pockets of intense development such as Pismo Beach and Monterey in the Central
Coast to the remote shores of northern California. The regional basis for the
tradable permit system will require detailed consideration of the different land
forms and erosion threats in order to define the appropriate boundaries for the
regions. Furthermore, we have also chosen to assess the feasibility of this approach
in the context of Coastal Act jurisdiction and have not addressed the jurisdiction of
the Bay Conservation and Development Commission (BCDC) in the San Francisco
Bay region, which will require a separate investigation.

The boundaries of the trading regions should be constrained by the natural
process of shoreline evolution (i.e., littoral cells) 39, but they must also be large
enough to comprise a competitive, efficient market. Although most local planning
for shoreline management is done under the auspices of LCPs, LCP regions are
unlikely to be large enough to meet these criteria. A more likely scenario is that a
trading region would encompass multiple LCP regions, and the marketplace would –
accordingly – need to reflect a diversity of local policies.
It is not clear whether ports and harbors should be included in a permit
trading system and, if so, how. The problems of shoreline protection are very
different for these areas than for residential or other commercial development
because they are for the most part already heavily engineered. There are also
potentially important differences between smaller ports primarily housing
recreational and fishing boats, large mega-ports handling large volumes of cargo,
and bulk ports specializing in petroleum or scrap metal.

The basic principles of the tradable permit system are outlined above, but
there are a number of operational details to be determined, including the total
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volume of permits, initial allocation rules, permit units required to take various
shore protection actions, and how long permissions granted by permits will be
effective. This will include defining the “classes” of permits that will distinguish
between nature based approaches and hard armoring approaches on which permit
requirements will be based. Many of these decisions will have to be made after
analysis of the above issues.

Establishing the initial conditions of the market in the form of permit
allocations has been shown to be perhaps the single most important factor in the
successful launch of a tradable permit system. 40 It has also been shown that equity
considerations are a critical factor in public acceptance of market approaches.
Mackenzie et al. This prototype creates an initial allocation of permits that is
proportional to linear shore frontage. Allocation based on total area is also possible
and may be preferred in some situations. Multiple allocation schemes should be
evaluated to determine which will be both effective at achieving the abovereferenced goals, and also perceived to be the most equitable.

Another operational question to be considered is: who should participate in
tradable permits market? Shoreline property owners are the obvious participants,
but the largest property owner on the California coast is the State of California
through myriad agencies including. Caltrans, State Parks, the Division of Boating
and Waterways, and others. Plausible arguments can be made to include some state
agencies, like State Parks, but not others (Caltrans). If State agencies are included, it
is not clear whether their participation in the permit market should be subject to
any special conditions. Similar issues exist with shorefront property owned by local
governments.
Other parties, such as conservation groups, may want to enter the market by
acquiring permit units that could be sold at discounted prices to owners wanting to
undertake particularly important environmentally protective actions. Rules will
need to be established about if and how such non-property owners can participate
in permit unit markets.
Institutional Formation: The Bank and The Environmental Agency

The Bank is a key to the success of the permit unit market. We envision the
Bank as the administrator of trades, but also as able to trade on its own account
(with an initial allocation of permit units) in order to both ensure the liquidity of the
marketplace, and – potentially through the use of its own trading earnings– to
support protection projects of regional significance that may not have otherwise
have adequate funding.
40
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A critical success factor for tradable permits is preventing the acquisition of
market power that would distort the functioning of the markets. 41 Market power
distortions occur when a single (monopoly) or a few (oligopoly) users acquire a
sufficient volume of tradable permissions that they can manipulate prices. Such
manipulation can include withholding permits or trades from the market to increase
the price artificially. Defense against market power is one of the key functions of the
Bank, which must be charged with using its stock of permit units to make sure that
the market is liquid at all times (that is, there needs to be an assurance to buyers
that the Bank is always available to sell them units at some benchmark price). The
Bank will have to manage conflicting goals of assuring competitive markets (which
may push permit unit prices down) at a time when as a trader it would prefer higher
prices. To be seen as a fair player, it will have to adopt policies that provide
significantly more transparency to its actions than would a normal market
participant.

The Environmental Agency has two principal functions. The first is to define
the regions within which trades will take place to ensure environmental compliance
of the program on a regional scale consistent with the overall purpose of the Coastal
Act. Regions must have a level of ecological coherence, probably based on the
concept of littoral cells. The process of delineating the trading regions offers the
opportunity to apply the California Environmental Quality Act through
programmatic environmental impact review (EIR).

The Environmental Agency’s other principal function is continual monitoring
to make sure that permit conditions are adhered to and enforced. The
Environmental Agency must also monitor overall environmental and shoreline
conditions in each trading region and be prepared to recommend changes in the
relative prices of armored and natural infrastructure depending on evolving
conditions given sea level rise, retreat from the shore, and evolving shoreline forms
and erosion patterns.
At this point we do not propose a specific agency to perform the functions of
the Environmental Agency. The Coastal Commission is clearly a candidate to
perform these functions, but we leave open the option of whether the Commission
or another existing agency or an entirely new agency would be appropriate.

Conclusions
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The California Coastal Act endeavors to balance the competing pressures on
the state’s lengthy but fragile shoreline. It recognizes the needs of property owners
exposed to flooding to take steps to prevent damages but also that such steps can be
damaging to other values protected by the Act and seeks to limit those damages.
Whether the decisions of the Coastal Commission have resulted in an appropriate
balance over the past forty years may be debated, but it is clear that the next forty
years will present the Commission with challenges to its responsibility for
maintaining California’s shores that were never envisioned when the Act was
passed. Under even the most optimistic scenarios, within decades much of the
shoreline on which Californians have built billions of dollars of structures will not
exist in the same place it is today. The risks of even greater change are becoming
apparent as we learn more about the potentially catastrophic consequences of rapid
ice sheet collapse. 42
This proposal for a tradable permit unit system to replace the Coastal Act’s
existing permitting system for protecting properties would represent a very
dramatic change in the way that the Coastal Act’s goals are implemented. We
recognize that the proposal requires significant elaboration both on technical issues
and with the affected communities (private and public property owners, local and
state agencies, the real estate community, and nongovernmental organizations).
Tradeable permit approaches have been shown to provide the flexibility and
efficiencies that will be needed and should be further assessed for California’s
shoreline management. The Coastal Act continues to set the destination towards
which management of California’s shores should be directed, but the course will
have to be very different than that in the past.
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